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RECENT BOOKS
BOOK REVIEWS
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.

By James ]. White and Robert S. Summers. St. Paul, Minnesota:
West Publishing Company. 1972. Pp. xxbc, 1054. $14.25.
I may well be an inappropriate reviewer for James J. White and
Robert S. Summers' Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code (Handbook). As the authors indicate in their preface
(p. xiii), they chose to address themselves to two audiences-law students and practitioners. I am neither, except in the sense that Arthur
Corbin urged us all to remain, as he was throughout his life, a student
of the law.
The task that Professors White and Summers set for themselves
in this one-volume treatise is an extraordinarily demanding one. To
discuss in only 1,000 pages the large variety of transactions for which
the Uniform Commercial Code (Code) is the governing law requires
choices and syntheses that most academicians would find a nightmare.
As the general literature illustrates, most of us who write seriously
about the Code take delight in extended exegeses on a few wellchosen, ill-drafted sections.1 Professors White and Summers have
courageously pursued an altogether different course. With remarkable success, they have provided an overview of the Code that is comprehensive in its coverage and critical in its analysis. The treatise
draws upon and integrates both the case law and the secondary literature that has developed around the Code.2 It is bound to be a firstline resource of exceptional utility.
The basic organization of the Handbook follows the pattern of
the Code itself; the major divisions of the Handbook mirror the various articles of the Code. However, within these divisions the chapters are, sensibly, organized around substantive issues rather than
Code sections. From time to time, the treatise undertakes important
excursions into related areas not covered by the text of the Code,
such as the impact of strict liability in tort on the warranty provisions
(pp. 295, 327-48, and 350-51) and the relevance of the Bankruptcy Act
to secured transactions (ch. 24). The materials on documents of title
contain an especially illuminating description of the federal statutes
that govern bills of lading (ch. 21). The book's subject matter index
serves as a reasonably useful backstop to the detailed table of contents, although I sorely miss an index by Code sections.
1. See, e.g., Peters, Suretyship Under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
77

YALE

L.J. 833 (1968).

2. For a comprehensive summary of the secondary literature, see M. EzER,
CoMMERCIAL CODE BIDLIOGRAPHY

(1972).
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Inevitably, despite my admiration for the Handbook, I find myself from time to time in disagreement with it. My difficulties are
of two very different sorts: On the one hand, there are specific issues on which I find the coverage of the treatise insufficiently helpful; on the other hand, there are general issues whose omission I
find puzzling.
White and Summers' discussion of article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code is marred, it seems to me, by the authors' failure to take
up with clarity the fundamental problem of the definition of "holder"
under articles I and 3. The construct of "holder" is, of course, crucial
to an understanding, not only of due course holding, but also of payment and hence of discharge, all classically central aspects of the law
of negotiable instruments. In the Code, this "holder" construct is
muddled by the contradictory nature of the instructions contained
in sections 1-201, 3-202, and 3-204.
The difficulty of defining who is a holder can best be appreciated
in a specific context. Consider the proper characterization of an innocent purchaser for value of an instrument tainted by theft. Under
section 1-201(20), the purchaser would qualify as a holder if he has
bought paper that was, or has become, bearer paper, or was indorsed
by his vendor, since he would then be "in possession of ... an instrument ... issued or indorsed to him . . . or to bearer or in blank." 3
Section 3-202 4 does not conflict with section 1-201(20) if the paper is
issued in bearer form. 5 But if order paper (or paper indorsed in
blank) contains a forged indorsement, no matter how remote, section
3-202 appears to deny holder status even to an innocent purchaser.6
3. Section 1-201(20) states:
"Holder" means a person who is in possession of a document of title or an instrument or an investment security drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his
order or to bearer or in blank.
4. Section 3-202, entitled "Negotiation," states:
(I) Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument in such form that the transferee becomes a holder. If the instrument is payable to order it is negotiated by
delivery with any necessary indorsement; if payable to bearer it is negotiated by
delivery.
(2) An indorsement must be ·written by or on behalf of the holder and on the
instrument or on a paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof.
(3) An indorsement is effective for negotiation only when it conveys the entire
instrument or any unpaid residue. If it purports to be of less it operates only as a
partial assignment.
(4) Words of assignment, condition, waiver, gnaranty, limitation or disclaimer
of liability and the like accompanying an indorsement do not affect its character
as an indorsement.
5. Bearer paper is negotiated by delivery alone, so possession satisfies both section
1-201 and section 3-202.
6. Section 3-202 conflicts with section 1-201(20)'s apparent protection of a person
possessing paper (genuinely) indorsed to him or in blank, if section 3-202(1) defines exclusively the process by which one becomes a holder and if section 3-202(2) determines
that only holders can negotiate. Each of these propositions is open to doubt. The text of
subsection I could also be construed as stating only one method of negotiation. The
official comment's cross-citation, without qualification, to the article I definition of
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In fact, the best argument for the conclusion that the innocent
taker of bearer paper can always be a holder, while the innocent taker
of order paper frequently cannot, is not the obscure language of article 3, but the clear understanding of the law of negotiable instruments. That law has assumed, since the mind of man runneth not
to the contrary, that a forged indorsement irretrievably and irrevocably breaks the chain of title; 7 such law is not reversed by mere perversities of drafting.
Of course, Professors White and Summers attest to the Code's
reaffirmation of this historical victory of the interests of ownership
over good faith purchase. I do not quarrel with their conclusion but
rather with their failure to appreciate how difficult it is for the average
reader, if not for the average law student, to derive the correct result
from the cited sections. Their treatment of the definition of "holder"
in section 14-3 (p. 459) of the treatise not only fails to refer back to
the theoretical underpinnings they themselves provide in section
13-10 (pp. 414-15), but also omits mention of the very important
analytical discussion contained in the senior author's own earlier
writing. 8
I am particularly troubled by so conclusory a treatment of the
holder problem because I am very unclear about the proper resolution of new dilemmas raised by some of the Code's explicitly revisionist sections. Under the pre-Code law of negotiable instruments, a
drawer or maker who wished ab initio to assure himself of discharge
upon subsequent good faith payment could do so by issuing paper
in bearer form. But section 3-204(3) allows a holder to convert bearer
paper into order paper and thus, unilaterally, to reintroduce into the
payment process the risk of latent forged indorsements.9 Is the genuine indorsement of the specially designated indorsee necessary to
qualify an innocent transferee as a holder in order to permit the
"holder" indicates that the draftsmen (or the comment writer) did not see any particular conflict. See UNIFOR."d: Co~rnERCIAL CODE § 3-202, Comment I. Further, subsection 2
is as plausibly an instruction about the mere location of an indorsement as about the
power of a particular transferee to negotiate. In all of this, it is, of course, assumed
that a forged indorsement, no matter how expert, can never be an effective indorsement
(see §§ 3-401, 3-404) except under the special circumstances of section 3-405.
7. See w. BRITION, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 463-64 (2d ed. 1961);
Kessler, Forged Indorsements, 47 YALE L.J. 863 (1938).
8. White, Some Petty Complaints About Article Three, 65 MicH. L. REv. 1315 (1967).
9. Section 3-204, headed "Special Indorsement; Blank Indorsement," provides:
(I) A special indorsement specifies the person to whom or to whose order it
makes the instrument payable. Any instrument specially indorsed becomes payable
to the order of the special indorsee and may be further negotiated only by his indorsement.
(2) An indorsement in blank specifies no particular indorsee and may consist
of a mere signature. An instrument payable to order and indorsed in blank becomes
payable to bearer and may be negotiated by delivery alone until specially indorsed.
(3) The holder may convert a blank indorsement into a special indorsement by
"-Titing over the signature of the indorser in blank any contract consistent with the
character of the indorsement.
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drawer or maker's payment to discharge him and to avoid his liability
for conversion? Presumably, the answer to this question _is yes.
Presumably, the effect of section 3-204 is to elevate rights of ownership over rights of discharge, even though, from the point of view
of the drawer or maker, the change made by the special indorsement
is at least as material as those alterations deemed invidious under
section 3-407 .10 Still, an enterprising court, conscious of possible
limitations on the domain of sections 3-202 and 3-204, might reach
a different result.11
My concern with defining and confining the construct of who is
a holder may reflect an academician's preoccupation with matters
"arcane" and "tedious."12 But there are other points too at which the
authors seem to have leapt rather too quickly, and with insufficient
attention to detail, to conclusions of policy. One of these is their
treatment of the celebrated case of Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National
Park Bank13 and its relationship to article 5, particularly section
5-ll4(2)(b). O'Meara is most often cited for the proposition that, in
a letter of credit transaction, the sole determinant of the issuing
bank's obligation to pay is the conformity of the tendered documents
to the terms of the letter of credit, regardless of the conformity (or
lack thereof) of the underlying goods to the specifications of the customer's contract with the beneficiary (p. 626). 14 This absolute separation of documents from goods-a point on which all of the
distinguished judges of the New York Court of Appeals were agreed
-is restated in article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code by sections 5-10915 and 5-ll4.16
10. Under section 3-407(1),
[a]ny alteration is material [and hence potentially discharging under subsection (2)1 which changes the contract of any party thereto in any respect, including
any such change in
(a) the number or relations of the parties; or
(b) an incomplete instrument, by completing it otherwise than as authorized;
or
(c) the writing assigned, by adding to it or by removing any part of it.
11. For instance, a court might hold subsequent indorsees, but not the maker or
drawer, bound by the instructions contained in the special indorsement.
12. Cf. HANDBOOK, at 415 n.53, 498 n.13, describing the senior author's earlier work
in "\Vhite, supra note 8.
13. 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 636 (1925).
14. See, e.g., G. GILMORE &: c. BLACK, THE LAW OF .ADMIRALTY 105 (1957).
15. Section 5-109, dealing with "Issuer's Obligation to Its Customer," states:
(1) An issuer's obligation to its customer includes good faith and observance of
any general banking usage but unless otherwise agreed does not include liability
or responsibility
(a) for performance of the underlying contract for sale or other transaction between the customer and the beneficiary; or
(b) for any act or omission of any person other than itself or its own branch or
for loss or destruction of a draft, demand or document in transit or in the
possession of others; or
(c) based on knowledge or lack of knowledge of any usage of any particular
trade.
(2) An issuer must examine documents with care so as to ascertain that on their
face they appear to comply with the terms of the credit but unless otherwise agreed
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But O'Meara was not a unanimous decision, and it is as instructive
for its disagreements as for its consensus. In the context of a suit on
behalf of the beneficiary seller, McLaughlin, for the majority,
held that the National Park Bank was obligated to pay whether or
not "the description of the merchandise contained in the documents
presented is correct."17 Cardozo dissented. In his view, a letter of
credit bank was entitled to refuse to pay a seller who had tendered
"false" documents when the bank could establish defects in "relation
to the description in the documents." 18 How does section 5-ll4(2)(b)
resolve this controversy? Clearly, the section allows the bank to
pay, if it so chooses, despite the receipt of derogatory information
from its customer; "good faith" is not likely to be a large constraint
on freedom to pay. It is the converse conduct that is unclear. In
the absence of an injunction, can the bank, if confident of its facts,
refuse to pay because of misrepresentations in the tendered documents?10 A right of refusal under certain circumstances is certainly
inferrable from section 5-114(2)(b): There may well be a breach
assumes no liability or responsibility for the genuineness, falsification or effect of
any document which appears on such examination to be regular on its face.
(3) A non-bank issuer is not bound by any banking usage of which it has no
knowledge.
16. Section 5-114, titled "Issuer's Duty and Privilege to Honor; Right to Reimbursement," states:
(1) An issuer must honor a draft or demand for payment which complies with
the terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether the goods or documents conform to the underlying contract for sale or other contract between the customer
and the beneficiary. The issuer is not excused from honor of such a draft or demand
by reason of an additional general term that all documents must be satisfactory to
the issuer, but an issuer may require that specified documents must be satisfactory
to it.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed when documents appear on their face to comply
with the terms of a credit but a required document does not in fact conform to the
warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a document of title (Section 7-507)
or of a security (Section 8-306) or is forged or fraudulent or there is fraud in the
transaction
(a) the issuer must honor the draft or demand for payment if honor is demanded by a negotiating bank or other holder of the draft or demand which
has taken the draft or demand under the credit and under circumstances
which would make it a holder in due course (Section 3-302) and in an appropriate case would make it a person to whom a document of title has
been duly negotiated (Section 7-502) or a bona fide purchaser of a security
(Section 8-202); and
(b) in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer acting in good faith may
honor the draft or demand for payment despite notification from the customer of fraud, forgery or other defect not apparent on the face of the
documents but a court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such honor.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed an issuer which has duly honored a draft or demand for payment is entitled to immediate reimbursement of any payment made
under the credit and to be put in effectively available funds not later than the day
before maturity of any acceptance made under the credit.
[Subsections 4 and 5 are omitted here since they are optional.]
17. 239 N.Y. at 397, 146 N.E. at 639.
18. 239 N.Y. at 402, 146 N.E. at 641.
19. I am indebted to Friedrich Kessler, Sterling Professor Emeritus at the Yale Law
School, for having brought this ambiguity to my attention.
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of warranty under section 7-507(b),20 or the document may be
"fraudulent." A refusal to pay that is premised upon nonconformity
with the terms of the credit is, as section 5-114(1) requires, independent of conformity to the underlying contract of sale. Yet the
latter observation begs the question of what kinds of discrepancies
constitute noncompliance "with the terms of the relevant credit."21
And a provision that an issuer "may honor" is not the equivalent
of a provision that an issuer "need not" honor. Given the prominence of the O'Meara case in the literature of letters of credit,
the draftman's indirection should perhaps be read to leave New
York law intact rather than reversed.22
It is characteristic of the drafting style of article 5 that its provisions (much like those of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Commercial Documentary Credits) tend to emphasize what a bank may
do rather than what it must do. Professors White and Summers recognize other instances of this drafting stance in their own discussion
of wrongful dishonor in section 18-6 (pp. 620-23). Still, I would have
welcomed an explicit examination of what it means to have a statute
that is more precise about the immunities it confers than about the
obligations it imposes. The broadly stated and repeated invitations
to private variation that White and Summers discuss (pp. 609-15) do
not, to my mind, make a statute's points of departure trivial or irrelevant. The issues of policy buried in the language and style of
section 5-114 in particular, and article 5 in general, would have benefitted from further elaboration.
20. Under section 7-507, on "Warranties on Negotiation or Transfer of Receipt or
Bill,"
Where a person negotiates or transfers a document of title for value otherwise
than as a mere intermediary under the next following section, then unless otherwise agreed he warrants to his immediate purchaser only in addition to any warranty made in selling the goods
(a) that the document is genuine; and
(b) that he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair its validity or
worth; and
(c) that his negotiation or transfer is rightful and fully effective with respect to
the title to the document and the goods it represents.
21. There is evidence that customers continue to request, and banks to issue, letters
of credit that require documents containing detailed information against which demands for payment must be measured. See, e.g., Banco Espanol de Credito v. State
Street Bank &: Trust Co., 385 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968)
(discussed in HANDBOOK, at 621, 625 n.108).
22. Such a reading would take the instructions contained in section 5-114(2)(b) to
contain only two alternatives: Ordinarily the bank must pay, and will be deemed in
good faith if it pays, despite suspicions of latent defects in the documents, but the customer may get an injunction to preclude payment on any of the grounds substantively
stated. The statute would thus be merely an extension of the procedure developed in
Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
That case assumed fraud in the factum; section 5-114(2)(b) allows judicial intervention
on a broader set of allegations, such as forgery and ordinary fraud.
It is perhaps worth noting that Comment 2 to section 5-114 suggests a broader reading and adoption of the Cardozo position.
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My difficulties with Professors White and Summers' treatment of
particular problems under articles 3 and 5 reflect, I suppose, natural
differences of opinion about what is worthy of emphasis and what
can be briefly summarized. I am more puzzled by the authors' failure to treat at all certain issues of both historical and contemporary
interest.
One of the precursors of article 9's detailed regulation of security
arrangements is the protection afforded at common law to claims of
ownership in chattels against the competing interests of good faith
purchasers and levying creditors. The common law dealt with these
irreconcilable claims through a variety of doctrines, such as fraudulent conveyance, ostensible ownership, cash sale, voidable title, and
entrusting.23 Article 2, as did the Uniform Sales Act24 before it, restates these principles and, inevitably, reshapes their contours. For
example, while prior statutes and case law emphasized the fraudulent
aspects of any seller's retention of possession of sold goods, section
2-403(2),25 in assessing the validity of a subsequent sale, looks instead to the seller's status and to the circumstances of the subsequent
buyer's purchase. Under this section, only a merchant seller26 has
power, after a prior sale, to pass good title, and then only to a buyer
in the ordinary course of business.27 Ordinary purchasers in good
23. See Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE LJ.
1057 (1954).
24. UNIFORM SALES Ac:r §§ 23-26.
25. Section 2-403(2) states:
Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that
kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary
course of business.
Entrusting is defined in section 2-403(3):
"Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the delivery or
acquiescence and regardless whether the procurement of the entrusting or the
possessor's disposition of the goods have been such as to be larcenous under the
criminal law.
26. Section 2-104(1) defines merchant:
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices
or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be
attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by
his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
The application of section 2-403(2) is limited to the class of merchants who deal in
goods of the kind, excluding those otherwise holding themselves out as having special
knowledge or skill.
27. Section 1-201(9) defines "buyer in the ordinary course of business" as
a person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods buys
in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind but
does not include a pawnbroker.••• "Buying" may be for cash or by exchange of
other property or on secured or unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or
documents of title under a pre-existing contract for sale but does not include a
transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt.
The 1972 amendment to the Code added an intermediary sentence, after "pawnbroker": "All persons who sell minerals or the like (including oil and gas) at wellhead
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faith from ordinary sellers are left to speculative arguments under
section 2-403(1) 28 involving either a distortion of "voidable title"
or an even less likely extension of "fraud punishable as larcenous."
In contrast to section 2-403, however, section 2-402 29 protects any
creditor who deals with any seller left in possession if the retention
is fraudulent against him under state law, regardless of the seller's
professional status or of the creditor's actual knowledge of the prior
sale.30 This latter aspect of the creditor's avoidance powers, because
it differs from his upset powers under section 9-301(1)(b),31 creates
interesting opportunities for jockeying between articles 2 and 9.
I find these article 2 provisions about third-party rights and their
interrelationship with article 9 both interesting and confusing. Perhaps they represent a draftsman dealing, on the one hand, with backor minehead shall be deemed to be persons in the business of selling goods of that
kind."
28. Section 2-403(1) provides:
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power
to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the
extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer
a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered
under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale," or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the
criminal law.
Section 2-403 concludes with:
(4) The rights of other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are governed
by the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9), Bulk Transfers (Article 6) and
Documents of Title (Article 7).
29. Section 2-402, entitled "Rights of Seller's Creditors against Sold Goods," states:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3), rights of unsecured creditors
of the seller with respect to goods which have been identified to a contract for
sale are subject to the buyer's rights to recover the goods under this Article (Sec•
tions 2-502 and 2-716).
(2) A creditor of the seller may treat a sale or an identification of goods to a
contract for sale as void if as against him a retention of possession by the seller is
fraudulent under any rule of law of the state where the goods are situated, except
that retention of possession in good faith and current course of trade by a merchant-seller for a commercially reasonable time after a sale or identification is not
fraudulent.
(3) Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to impair the rights of creditors of
the seller
(a) under the provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9); or
(b) where identification to the contract or delivery is made not in current
course of trade but in satisfaction of or as security for a pre-existing claim
for money, security or the like and is made under circumstances which under
any rule of law of the state where the goods are situated would apart from
this Article constitute the transaction a fraudulent transfer or voidable
preference.
30. There is a minor exception for buyers who leave goods with a merchant seller
for a commercially reasonable (presumably brief) period of time.
31. Under the 1962 Official Text, section 9-30l(l)(b), defining those who could take
priority over unperfected security interests, included "a person who becomes a lien
creditor without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected."
The 1972 amended version of article 9 deletes the knowledge requirement, bringing
article 9 into line with the section 2-402(2) formulation. The new section provides upset
powers for. "a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is
perfected."
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stops and, on the other, with serious commercial problems; perhaps
they reflect a change in attitude brought about as the Code's horizons
expanded and its drafting style became more technical. In any case,
I was disappointed that I could discover no mention in the Handbook of any of these problems, save for the brief comparison of sections 2-403 and 9-307 (pp. 944-46) and the elliptical observation that
"[i]n certain respects, 2-403 is more generous to subsequent purchasers than is 9-307" (p. 945).
It may well be that the article 2 provisions on third-party claims
do not loom large in the litigation under the Code. Yet they are illustrative of a larger question that the authors have been reluctant to
explore. Sections 2-402 and 2-403 draw explicitly, as many sections of
the Code draw implicitly,32 upon pre-existing common law. What is
the role of a statute like the Code in a common law jurisprudence?
In the absence of express incorporation or contradiction, to what
extent should courts view the Code as a source of common law?33
Earlier American statutes codifying parts of what we call commercial law were often swallowed whole by the common law. Just as
Judge Mansfield subjugated English mercantile law by incorporating
it into general common law, so the Uniform Sales Act well-nigh disappeared from view into the common law, despite its broad enactment.34 As John Honnold has noted, "Our courts have a loose way
with statutes when they feel they understand the problem." 35 A less
kind commentator might have added, "whether or not they in fact
understand."
Karl Llewellyn, the chief draftsman of the Code, was acutely
conscious of, and essentially sympathetic toward, the "Common Law
Tradition," as he entitled his last book. Grant Gilmore, a collaborator of long standing in the drafting of the Code, described Llewellyn's view: "He had clearly in mind the idea of a case-law Code,
one that would furnish guidelines for a fresh start, would accommodate itself to changing circumstances, would not so much contain
the law as free it for a new growth."36 Llewellyn's approach is
sometimes traceable into the wording of certain operative sections,
32. In article 2, see, for example, the common law concepts of title (section 2-401),
substantial impairment of value (sections 2-608 and 2-612), and proximate damages
(sections 2-714 and 2-715).
33. See generally Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CA.TH. U. L.
REV. 401 (1968), reprinted in 43 CAL. ST. BAR J. 509 (1968).
34. See Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. CoLO. L. REv. 461, 466-67 (1967).
35. Honnold, American Experience under the Sales Article of the Uniform Commercial Code, in AsPECTS OF COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL !..Aw: SALES, CoNSUMER CREDIT
AND SECURED TRANSAcrIONS 3, 10
Ziegel&: W. Foster ed. 1969) [hereinafter AsPECTS OF
COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL LAW].
For a particularly striking example of "looseness" with article 2's remedial sections,
see the interpretation of sections 2-714 and 2-715 in Keystone Diesel Engine Co. v.
Irwin, 411 Pa. 222, 191 A.2d 376 (1963).
36. Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 814 (1962).

a.
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for example, section 2-302 37 and sections 9-102 and 9-202.38 But it
is principally memorialized by the general prescriptions in article I,
which are designed to assure, as much as any statute can, capacities
for flexibility and adaptation and growth.89 Professors White and
Summers pass over these sections (pp. 14-16 and 19-20),40 as over the
pre-Code case law (p. xiv), without sufficient attention to their
implication for cases as yet undecided, problems as yet unlitigated,
and issues as yet unappreciated. As Grant Gilmore has said:
We know enough about the experience of living with statutes or
under Codes to know that the early opponents of codification were
wrong in £earing that the result of codification would be to freeze
the law as of the date of the Code's enactment. The law, codified,
goes its merry way-much to the disgust of conservative practitioners
-and at much the same pace as the law, uncodified.41

A treatise about the Uniform Commercial Code should take seriously
every article that the Code contains.
In the final analysis, however, it bears repeating that no two authors, not to speak of three, 42 can be expected to take the same view
of the field of commercial law or of the role of the Code in that law. 43
Professors White and Summers' emphasis on the emerging case law
under the Code, and their critical analysis of that case law, provide
a sound and functional approach to a fascinating and complex field.
The success of their treatise is as assured as it is well-deserved.

Ellen A. Peters,
Professor of Law,
Yale Law School
37. The approach of section 2-302 is described and criticized in Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967), and in
subsequent articles describing and criticizing Professor Leif's approach (cited in the
HANDBOOK, at 115 n.12).
38. These sections define the broad sweep of article 9 to be operative, under section
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